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The telemarketing business has experienced
substantial growth in the United States over the
past few decades. I Recent studies have shown that
on any given day there are more than 300,000 so-
licitors working on behalf of telemarketing com-
panies to contact over 18 million people.2 As
many of us are aware, consumers often feel both-
ered by the intrusion of the solicitation call, and
harassed by the operator who is attempting to sell
a service or product." While the telemarketing
business is dominated by sales companies con-
ducting business over the phone, charitable orga-
nizations have also taken advantage of technologi-
cal advances to solicit monetary donations from a
larger pool of consumers. 4 However, many con-
tributors are later outraged when they learn that
only a small portion of their donations actually
reach the intended charity, and an even smaller
amount is given to the individuals which the char-
ity purports to serve.5
Charitable telemarketing was placed in the hot
seat following the tragic events of September 11,
2001, when many sham organizations preyed
upon the vulnerabilities of the American people
I Michael E. Shannon, Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls:
The "Do-Not-Call" Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem,
27J. LEGIS. 381, 385 (2001).
2 Edwin L. Klett & Rochelle L. Brightwell, Exercise in Free
Speech or Just a Pain in the Neck?, 24 PA. LAw. 38 (2002).
- Hilary B. Miller & Robert R. Biggerstaff, Application of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act to Intrastate Telemarketing
Calls and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 686 (2000) (citing
statistics that indicate 0.1% of the population enjoy receiving
unsolicited calls and 69% find telemarketing to be offensive).
4 See generally, Consuelo Landa Kertz & Lisa Boardman
Burnette, Telemarketing Tug-of-War: Balancing Telephone Infor-
mation Technology and the First Amendment with Consumer Protec-
tion and Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029 (1992) (discussing
how technological advances in telephone equipment have
aided in expanding the telemarketing industry).
5 See, e.g., People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.,
763 N.E.2d. 289, 293 (Il1. 2001), discussed infra Part IIIA.
"[Forty-four] VietNow donors ... assert that they would not
have given money to the charity had they known how little of
by claiming to raise money for the victims of the
terrorist attacks.1' Eliot Spitzer, the New York State
Attorney General, was so concerned with these
fraudulent activities that he demanded accounta-
bility and reform in fundraising activities. 7 Con-
gress also responded by adding an eleventh hour
amendment to the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Adequate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA
PATRIOT Act")" that increased the Federal Trade
Commission's ("FTC") regulatory power over
charitable telemarketing.9 Despite these efforts,
questions still remain as to whether charitable
telemarketing should continue, and whether the
industry should be regulated further.
This Comment will address the current land-
scape in regulating charitable telemarketing. Part
I will provide background information on
telemarketing and will discuss how it has evolved
into a multi-million dollar industry. Experiences
in New York will be used as an example to demon-
strate how fraudulent behavior may be coupled
with this legitimate business. Additionally, the dis-
cussion of New York will briefly explore the con-
their donation was to be directed to the intended cause." Id.
6 FRAUD SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARrMFNT
OFJUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT ON POSSIBLE FRAUD SCHEMES-SO-
LICITATIONS OF DONATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORIST AT-
TACKS, at http://www.udoj.gov/criminal/fraud/WTCPent-
SpecRpt.htm (last modified Sept. 27, 2001) [hereinafter SPE-
CIAL REPORT ON POSSIBLE FRAUD].
7 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney Gen-
eral Eliot Spitzer, Report Shows How Fundraisers Profit From
Charitable Giving, at http://www.oag.ny.us/press/2002/
dec/dec23b_02.html (Dec. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Press Re-
lease, How Fundraisers Profit].
8 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
9- Id. at §1011; see also COUNCIL FOR ADVANCEMENT AND
SUPPORT OF EDUCATION, CHANGES TO TELEMARKETING SALES
RULE IN THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION, at www.case.org/
issueswatch/telemarketingcfm (last modified June 2002)
[hereinafter CASE].
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cern with for-profit telemarketing companies
working on behalf of charitable organizations that
retain a large percentage of the contributions
they solicit. Part II will outline the development
of federal laws that currently regulate this field
and will demonstrate how charities have been ex-
cluded from these regulations because of the
unique First Amendment protections afforded to
charitable organizations. Part III will discuss the
FTC's response to the Congressional delegation
of power within the USA PATRIOT Act, focusing
on the amended definition of fraud that now in-
corporates for-profit organizations working on be-
half of a charity. This section will also address the
Supreme Court's response to percentage-based
regulations, which limit the percentage of contri-
butions that telemarketing companies may retain,
and will analyze whether the retention of fees by
the telemarketing company is fraudulent behav-
ior. Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of the
national "do-not-call" list and lays the legal frame-
work for the conclusion that for-profit organiza-
tions should be restricted from unsolicited
telemarketing by the national database.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF TELEMARKETING
Telemarketing' ° is not a new sales technique in
this country. I This phenomenon emerged dur-
10 The Electronic Privacy Information Center defines
telemarketing as:
a practice where a business initiates a phone call in or-
der to propose a commercial transaction .... Business
to consumer telemarketing takes place in two different
ways: first, inbound telemarketing is the business use of a
telephone to accept consumer calls regarding a product.
Inbound telemarketing usually occurs where a consumer
responds to direct mail or a television advertisement.
Second, outbound telemarketing is the practice of plac-
ing calls to consumers for sales purposes.
ELECTRONIC PRDIACY INFORMATION CENTER, TELEMARKETING
AND THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, at http://
www.epic.org/privacy/telemarketing (last modified Jan. 8,
2003) [hereinafter EPIC]. The definitions used by the FCC
and FTC will be discussed infra sections II and III.
11 See Hebe R. Smythe, Fighting Telemarketing Scams, 17
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 347, 349-50 (1994).
12 Id.
'3 See generally Patrick E. Michela, "You May Have Already
Won... ": Telemarketing Fraud and the Need for a Federal Legisla-
tive Solution, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 553 (1994) (discussing generally
how a typical telemarketing company operates).
14 Smythe, supra note 11, at 349-50; see Kertz & Burnette,
supra note 4, at 1055.
15 Smythe, supra note 11, at 349 n.2 (citing Telemarketing
Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong.
ing World War II when sales companies were
forced to find alternate means of reaching con-
sumers. 12 Many companies elected to use tele-
phone operators to expand their business, begin-
ning what would ultimately become a multi-bil-
lion dollar industry by the 1990s.' 3 The practice
has continued to grow since its inception, particu-
larly in the 1970s when the oil crisis made door-to-
door sales more difficult, and in the 1980s when
technological growth hit a new high. 14
Telemarketing has become a legitimate form of
business in this country' 5 because the telephone
is one of the most convenient and cost-effective
ways for organizations to make contact with po-
tential customers. The telemarketing industry
stimulated the economy by generating sales total-
ing more than $274 million dollars in 2001
alone. 16 In addition, in this same year, four mil-
lion workers were employed by the telemarketing
industry,17 which often provides services to those
not able to leave their home easily."'
However, even with the benefits of telemarket-
ing, "92 percent of adults in the United States re-
ported receiving fraudulent telephone offers."'19
The United States Department of Justice
("DOJ") 2° calculates that each year one out of
every six consumers is taken advantage of by
fraudulent telemarketing schemes. 21 The DOJ
concluded that "there are at least several hundred
4 (1992)).
16 Ian H. Gershengorn, Telemarketing Restrictions and the
First Amendment, 20 COMM. LAWYER 3 (2002).
17 Id.
18 Ann Marie Arcadi, What About the Lucky Leprechauan?:
An Argument Against "The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, " 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 417, 423-24 (1991) (quoting
Joan Mullen, President of American Telemarketing Associa-
tion) ("[T]he negative perception that outbound telemarket-
ing is an intrusion . . . are magnified by the fact that out-
bound telemarketing provides a service to the consumer and
is profitable as a business. It provides a service to people who
are housebound-they are able to conduct businesses,
purchase items, and get information via telephone.").
19 Klett & Brightwell, supra note 2, at 38 (citing a Louis
Harris survey conducted for the National Consumers
League).
20 The DOJ defines telemarketing fraud as "any scheme
to defraud in which the persons carrying out the scheme use
the telephone as their primary means of communicating with
prospective victims and trying to persuade them to send
money to the scheme." FRAUD SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVqSION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WHAT IS TELEMARKETING
FRAUD?, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/
telemarketing/whatis.htm (last modified Sept. 25, 1998)
[hereinafter FRAUD DEFINITION].
21 Klett & Brightwell, supra note 2, at 39.
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fraudulent telemarketing operation-some of
them employing as many as several dozen peo-
ple-in North America that routinely seek to de-
fraud consumers." 22 This type of fraudulent activ-
ity costs North Americans an estimated $400 bil-
lion annually.23
Unfortunately, these fraudulent tendencies
have also spread into the business of charitable
telemarketing. 24 It is estimated that over 70% of
American households make charitable donations
every year and seldom are they provided informa-
tion regarding where their money goes or how
their contribution is spent.25 This is problematic
for both the legitimate charities that collect
money for worthy causes and the victims of
fraud.26
New York serves as an interesting case study for
charitable contributions due to the Attorney Gen-
eral's yearly report on charitable solicitations27
and the enormous influx of donations following
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.28 Ma-
jor concerns with charitable solicitation were ad-
dressed publicly in the aftermath of September
l1th,2 9 such as the speed in which the govern-
ment and charities distributed monetary contribu-
tions,3° reports of individuals pretending to be
22 FRAUD DEFINITION, supra note 20.
23 UNITED STATES-CANADA WORKING GROUP, UNITED
STATES-CANADA COOPERATION AGAINST CROss-BORDER
TELEMARKETING FRAUD 1 (1997) ("Telemarketing fraud has
become one of the most pervasive and problematic forms of
white-collar crime in Canada and the United States, account-
ing for as much as 10 percent of the total volume of
telemarketing [$400 billion per year]."); Sarah Reznek,
Fraudulent Telemarketing: Crime and Punishment, 77 MICH. B.J.
1210, 1210 n.1 (1998).
24 Charity Fraud, SENIORMAG.COM, at http://
www.seniormag.com/legal/charity%20fraud.htm (2002).
25 Charitable Contributions for September 11: Protecting
Against Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. On Energy
and Commerce, 107th Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of Rep.
Greenwood, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce) [hereinafter Charitable Hearing].
26 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Bratkiewicz, "Here's a Quarter, Call
Someone who Cares ": Who is Answering the Elderly's Call for Protec-
tion From Telemarketing Fraud?, 45 S.D. L. REv. 586 (2000) (ex-
amining the problem of telemarketing companies that specif-
ically target and victimize the elderly in their quest to make a
profit). "While individuals of all ages are susceptible to the
guile of unscrupulous con-artist, fraudulent consumer prac-
tices have a devastating impact on senior citizens." Id.
27 STATE OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF ATT-ORNEY GENERAL,
CHARITIES, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/chari-
ties.html (last modified Jan. 2003) (containing copies of
these reports).
28 CHARITIES BUREAU, STATE OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF AT-
victims by falsifying documents in order to collect
from charitable organizations,31 and groups that
held themselves out as legitimate charities but, in
reality, were scamming people out of money.3 2
However, perhaps the most significant trend in
charitable telemarketing has become the increas-
ingly high fees retained by professional
telemarketing companies. 3 i
Charitable organizations often hire telemarket-
ing companies to conduct fundraising campaigns
on their behalf, but the for-profit telemarketing
companies often retain a large percentage of the
donation as profit.3 4 In New York alone there
were 588 fundraising campaigns in 2001. 35 These
campaigns solicited contributions totaling ap-
proximately $184.7 million, but only $58.9 million
of the total amount raised was subsequently trans-
ferred to the charities.3 6 These figures demon-
strate that only 31.9% of donations were given to
the charitable organizations.3 7 In fact, only eight
campaigns gave 80% or more of their gross re-
ceipts to the charitiesY.3 Perhaps most troubling is
the fact that some charities lost money by hiring
professional telemarketing companies because
the business contract did not guarantee a specific
dollar amount in return for the services of the
TORNEY GENERAL, SEPTEMBER ITH CHARITIES RELIEF: AN
OVERVIEW AT ONE YEAR, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/chari-
ties/septemberl I _charitablereport/septl lreport.html
(last modified Sept. 2002) (listing the organizations that col-
lected money and the amount they had received after one
year).
29 See Charitable Hearing, supra note 25.
31 See Report: U.S. Slow to Pay 9/11 Aid, MSNBC.COM, at
http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/853236.asp?cpl=l (Dec. 30,
2002); Did Contributions Reach Destinations?, CBSNEWS.cOM, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/09/earlyshow/
printable521331.shtml (Sept. 10, 2002).
31 See Jonathon Wald, Men Charged with Defrauding 9/11
Charities, CNN.COM, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/
20/attacks.theft (Dec. 24, 2002).
32 SPECIAL REPORT ON POSSIBLE FRAUD, supra note 6.
33 Press Release, How Fundraisers Profit, supra note 7.
34 "60 percent to 70 percent of nonprofit and charitable
organizations use professional fundraisers to deliver their
messages to consumers and solicit donations." Gershengorn,
supra note 16, at 3 (quoting the Not-for-Profit and Charitable
Coalition's response to the FTC's proposed amendments).
35 CHARITIES BUREAU, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
LAW, PENNIES FOR CHARITY, WHERE YOUR MONEY GOES:
TELEMARKETING By PROFESSIONAL FUND RAISERS, at http://
www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/pennies02/penintro.html (last
modified Dec. 2002).
36 Id.
3 7 Id.
3 8 Id.
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telemarketing company.39 The telemarketing
companies justify retaining such a large percent-
age of the donations as a fee for their services and
as "other costs" 40 associated with raising the
money.4 i
The current New York State Attorney General,
Eliot Spitzer, has voiced his concern regarding
this trend in professional telemarketing on several
occasions. 42 For example, in December of 2001,
he stated, "This is a critical moment for the na-
tion's charities. These organizations will not be
able to maintain the trust of the American people
if they continue to use telemarketers that keep
the lion's share of the donations."43 These senti-
ments have been echoed by Ronna D. Brown,
President of the Metro NY Better Business Bureau
Wise Giving Alliance, 44 who stated, "Donors de-
serve a full and accurate accounting of what por-
tion of their donation is going to pay for fundrais-
ing expenses .... Accountability starts with good
governance and we support all measures that help
Boards understand their responsibilities." 45 In re-
sponse to the increase in the number of
telemarketing campaigns, the rise in reports of
fraudulent activity, and concern expressed at both
the state and national levels, there has been con-
'39 Id.
40 Press Release, How Fundraisers Profit, supra note 7.
41 In Telemarketing Associates, 763 N.E.2d 289, 297, dis-
cussed infra Part IlA, the Illinois Supreme Court noted, "in
exchange for its fee, Telemarketing agreed to supply and pay
the salaries of all marketing personnel, as well as pay all costs
for an office and phones. In addition, Telemarketing agreed
to be responsible for producing, publishing, editing and pay-
ing all costs for the annual publication of more than 2,000
copies of an advertising magazine which would 'increase
community awareness of [VietNow]."' It is important to note
that the retained fee is not always 100% profit.
42 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF NONPROFITS, INC., LITIGA-
TION AND LEGISLATION AFFECTING NONPROFITS, at http://
www.thedma.org/nonprofitfederation/litigate.htm.
43 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney Gen-
eral Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer Calls for Reforms in Charitable
Fundraising: AG Considers Suits Against For-Profit Compa-
nies that Take Advantage of Charitable Donors, at http://
www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2001/dec/decl9a _01.html (Dec.
19, 2001) [hereinafter Press Release, Calls for Reforms].
44 The Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance re-
ports on nationally soliciting charitable organizations. See
COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, INC., CBBB STAN-
DARDS FOR CHARITABLE SOLICITATION, at http://
www.give.org/standards/cbbbstds.asp (1992) for overview of
the standards it uses to evaluate charitable solicitations.
45 Press Release, Calls for Reforms, supra note 43.
46 Rita M. Cain, Call Up Someone and Just Say 'Buy' -
Telemarketing and the Regulatory Environment, 31 An. Bus. L.J.
641, 641-42 (1994).
47 See EPIC, supra note 10.
siderable activity in the legislative arena to regu-
late telemarketing practices. 46
II. FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Despite the frustrations expressed by the public
about the telemarketing business,47 legislators
nevertheless acknowledge the interests and consti-
tutional rights of telemarketers as well as those of
their constituents. 48 Congress has announced that
an "[i] ndividuals' privacy rights, public safety in-
terests, and commercial freedoms of speech and
trade must be balanced in a way that protects the
privacy of individuals and permits legitimate
telemarketing practices." 4 9  Thus, the
telemarketer's First Amendment rights must be
weighed against the privacy concerns of the con-
sumer when evaluating regulation of the prac-
tice. 50
Two main pieces of federal legislation, the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
("TCPA")5 I and the Telemarketing Sales Rule
("TSR") ,52 govern the field of telemarketing.
Even though 40 states had already placed restric-
tions on telemarketing practices, 53 the TCPA was
48 Shannon, supra note 1, at 383.
49 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-243, §2(9), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394.
50 See Brook Dambacher, Hanging Up on the First Amend-
ment: An Analysis of Contemporary Telemarketing Regulations, 14
Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 325, 331 (2002).
51 47 U.S.C. §227 (2000) (granting power to the FCC to
regulate telemarketing practices).
52 16 C.F.R. pt. 310 (2003) (granting power to the FTC
to regulate fraudulent behavior within the telemarketing
field).
55 See Cain, supra note 46, at 655-62 (discussing the vari-
ous methods that states employed prior to the enactment of
the TCPA and outlining the code sections of each individual
state in Appendix A); Michela, supra note 13, at 580-597.
Today, there are only seven states that have not yet acted to
regulate telemarketing within their states: Iowa, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Ver-
mont. Patricia Pattison & Anthony F. McGann, State
Telemarketing Legislation: A Whole Lotta Law Goin' On!., 3 Wyo.
L. REv. 167, 176-92 (2003) (analyzing state telemarketing leg-
islation and discussing its ineffectiveness). Many states have
already enacted "do-not-call" lists within their state thus rais-
ing the difficult question of how the new federal regulations
will interact with those already implemented within the
states.
At this time, the [FTC] does not intend the [TSR] provi-
sions establishing a national 'do-not-call' registry to pre-
empt state 'do-not-call' laws. Rather, the [FFC's] intent
is to work with those states that have enacted 'do-not-
call' registry laws ... to articulate requirements and pro-
cedures during what it anticipates will be a relatively
[Vol. 12
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the first piece of federal legislation to regulate the
field. 54
A. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991
When enacted in 1991, the TCPA amended Ti-
tle II of the Communications Act of 193455 by
placing restrictions on the use of certain tele-
phone equipment in the telemarketing business
and by granting authority to the Federal Commu-
nications Commission ("FCC") to regulate tele-
phone solicitations..5 6 One of the motivating fac-
tors for Congressional action was that "residential
telephone subscribers consider[ed] automated or
prerecorded telephone calls, regardless of the
content or the initiator of the message, to be a
nuisance and an invasion of privacy."57 Thus,
under the TCPA, it is unlawful for automatic dial-
ing systems to place calls to emergency or medical
facilities or to any number that is charged per
telephone call, such as a cellular phone. 58 Addi-
tionally, telemarketing companies are banned
from using prerecorded voice messages to contact
private residences unless the company had re-
ceived the resident's consent prior to placing the
call. 59 Moreover, telemarketers are precluded
from sending advertisements via telephone fac-
similes.6 °1
Due to concerns that a blanket ban on live op-
erator calls would be challenged on free speech
grounds, Congress choose instead to grant the
short transition period leading to one harmonized 'do-
not-call' registry system and a singe set of compliance
obligations. The [FTC] is actively consulting with the in-
dividual states to coordinate implementation of the na-
tional registry to minimize duplication and maximize ef-
ficiency for consumers and business.
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4638 (Jan. 29,
2003) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310). See also In re Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014,
paras. 12-13 (2003) [hereinafter Report and Order] (discussing
the FCC's approach to integrating a national "do-not-call" list
with pre-existing state databases). The constitutionality of
state telemarketing regulations is determined by the same
standards used to evaluate federal restrictions. See supra Part
IVA.
54 Gershengorn, supra note 16.
55 47 U.S.C. §201 et. seq.
56 Id. at §227.
57 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-243, §2(10), 105 Stat. 2394.
58 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
59 Id. at §227(b) (1) (B).
60 Id. at §227(d)(1)(D).
FCC power to regulate live telemarketing calls as
it deemed necessary."' The TPCA also authorized
the FCC to create a national "do-not-call" list.62
However, the FCC declined to establish the na-
tional database at that time, choosing instead to
require each company to keep a record of individ-
uals who did not wish to be called."3
The TCPA provides two main remedies for con-
sumers that receive calls in violation of the Act.64
An individual, or the state, may file a right of ac-
tion for injunctive relief, or they may file a right of
action to collect monetary damages. 15 However,
this legislation exempts non-profit organizations
from its definition of telephone solicitation,
thereby excluding suits against telemarketing
companies that provide services for charities. 66
Because all non-profit organizations are ex-
empted, Congress determined that further legisla-
tion was required to encompass problems associ-
ated with charitable telemarketing.
B. The Telemarketing Sales Rule
In 1994, Congress passed the Telemarketing
and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act
("TCFAP"), 6 7 which supplemented the TCPA by
authorizing the FTC to regulate abusive
telemarketing behavior.68 Under this Act, Con-
gress chose to give specific powers to the FTC,
supplementing the general jurisdiction of the
FCC, because of the FTC's prominent role in
curbing consumer abuse. 69 Congress found that
61 Dambacher, supra note 50, at 327-28.
62 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(1)(A) and (c)(3). For further dis-
cussion of the "do-not-call" list, see supra Part IV.
63 Dambacher, supra note 50, at 327-28.
64 47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(3) and (f)(1).
65 Id.
66 Telemarketing solicitation is defined as "the initiation
of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encourag-
ing the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property,
goods, or services, which is transmitted to any person, but
such term does not include a call or message . . .by a tax
exempt nonprofit organization." Id. at §227(a) (3).
67 15 U.S.C. §§6101-6108 (1998).
68 Dambacher, supra note 50, at 328.
69 See Aronberg v. Federal Trade Commission, 132 F.2d 165,
167 (7th Cir. 1942).
[T]he buying public does not ordinarily carefully study
or weigh each word in an advertisement. The ultimate
impression upon the mind of the reader arises from the
sum total of not only what is said but also of all that is
reasonably implied .... The [Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act] is not made for experts but to protect the pub-
lic-that vast multitude including the ignorant, the un-
thinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases,
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"[i] nterstate telemarketing fraud [had] become a
problem of such magnitude that the resources of
the [FTC before this Act were] not sufficient to
ensure adequate consumer protection from such
fraud."70 Subsequent to this grant of additional
power, the FTC passed the TSR.7 1
In an effort to reduce deceptive telemarketing
practices, the TSR requires that certain disclo-
sures be made to the consumer during every tele-
phone call. 72 For example, an operator is re-
quired to identify who is selling the product, to
state he is calling with the intention of making a
sale, and to describe the product being sold or de-
pict accurately the prize being won. 73 Addition-
ally, before a telemarketing operator may collect
money, the operator must announce the total
cost, all applicable conditions to the sale, and the
company's refund policy. 7 4  Finally, the
telemarketer must receive express authorization
from the consumer to complete the sale. 75 More
generally, the TSR prohibits residential calls from
being made before 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m., unless
the resident consents to receiving calls at other
times. 76 Finally, the TSR requires companies to
maintain proper records of its advertisements,
promotions, and customers. 77
However, the TSR as originally enacted does
not apply to certain forms of telemarketing, such
as those conducted by banks, federal financial in-
stitutions, common carriers, insurance compa-
nies, and non-profit organizations. 78 These ex-
emptions exist because of the limited jurisdiction
of the FTC. 79 The FTC operates as an indepen-
dent agency under the authority of the Federal
Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"). s0 However,
do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by ap-
pearances and general impressions.
70 Telemarketing And Consumer Fraud and Abuse Pre-
vention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-297, §2, 108 Stat. 1545 (1994).
71 16 C.F.R. §310 (1995).
72 Id. at §310.4.
73 Id. at §310.4(d).
74 Id. at §310.3.
75 Id. at §310.3(3).
76 Id. at §310.4 (c).
77 Id. at §310.5.
78 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (2).
79 It is important to note that the FCC does regulate
these industries. DIRECT MARKETING BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE,
FTC UNVEILS Do-NOT-CALL PLAN AND TOUGH NEW TELE-
PHONE RULES, at http://www.directmag.com/ar/market-
ing.ftc-unveilsdonotcall/ (last modified Dec. 18, 2002).
80 15 U.S.C §§41-51. As the FTC's own mission statement
states,
the [FTC] enforces a variety of federal antitrust and con-
the FTC Act specifically limits jurisdiction to
"profit-making corporations." 8 1 As a result,
telemarketing companies providing services on
behalf of charities do not have to follow the TSR's
requirements with respect to telemarketing prac-
tices, thereby leaving consumers open to fraud.
Therefore, if Congress intended to regulate chari-
table telemarketing, further legislation was re-
quired.
III. THE FTC RESPONSE TO THE
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION OF
POWER WITHIN THE USA PATRIOT
ACT
The USA PATRIOT Act extends the FTC's au-
thority to regulate, amongst other things, charita-
ble telemarketing fraud by providing it with "an
additional tool to address charitable fraud."' 2 In
effect, section 10 11 of the USA PATRIOT Act ex-
tends the reach of the TSR to for-profit compa-
nies working on behalf of a charitable organiza-
tion. 3 This has been accomplished by expanding
the definition of telemarketing within the TCFAP
to cover any "plan, program, or campaign which
is conducted to induce ... a charitable contribu-
tion, donation, or gift of money or any other
thing of value, by use of one or more telephones
which involves more than one interstate tele-
phone call."8' 4 This refined definition stems from
Congress' concern over sham organizations that
disguised themselves as charities and took advan-
tage of generous donors after the events of Sep-
tember 11 th.8 5
The FTC responded to the USA PATRIOT Act
sumer protection laws. The Commission seeks to ensure
that the nation's markets function competitively, and are
vigorous, efficient, and free of undue restrictions. The
Commission also works to enhance the smooth opera-
tions of the marketplace by eliminating acts or practices
that are unfair or deceptive.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, VISSION, MISSION & GOALS, at
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/mission.htm (last modified June 17,
1999).
81 15 U.S.C. §44; see generally Community Blood Bank v.
FTC, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969).
82 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PREPARED STATEMENT OF
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON CHARITABLE SOLICITATION
FRAUD, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/20O1/11/chaitablesolic-
itationfraud.htm (Nov. 6, 2001).
83 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §1011, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
84 Id. §1011(b)(3).
85 CASE, supra note 9.
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amendment by announcing a proposed rule
change to the TSR. 86 The FTC explained "that it
is necessary to amend the original Rule to ensure
that the Telemarketing Act's goals are met-that
is, encouraging the growth of the legitimate
telemarketing industry, while curtailing those
practices that are abusive and deceptive."' 7 The
FTC has been careful to make the distinction that
they have not been given blanket authority to regu-
late charitable telemarketing, but have been given
the authority to regulate deceptive acts by charita-
ble organizations and to require for-profit
telemarketing companies working on behalf of a
charitable organization to comply with the TSR.8
The amended rules seek to prevent scam orga-
nizations from soliciting over the telephone by re-
quiring the operator to give more information
than is required under the original TSR.89 The
major addition to section 310 of the TSR, which
regulates the disclosures required prior to a sale,
is the requirement that every statement be made
"truthfully."90 This raises the standard from
merely requiring that the disclosures be made, to
requiring that they be made honestly.9' Addition-
ally, it is no longer sufficient simply to give the
odds of winning a prize promotion; the
telemarketer must disclose that a purchase will
not enhance the chance of winning.9 2 Further-
more, to reduce unauthorized billing, the
telemarketer must disclose "the limits on a card-
holder's liability for unauthorized use of a credit
card."93 Finally, telemarketers are prohibited
from "abandoning" callers,94 and they are re-
quired to transmit Caller-Id information so that a
recipient is aware of who is calling before answer-
ing.9 5
86 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 67 Fed Reg. 4492 (Jan. 30,
2002) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310); Press Release,
Federal Trade Commission, FTC Proposes National "Do-Not
Call" Registry: Commission Seeks Comment on Registry and
Other Proposed Changes to the Telemarketing Sales Rule, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/donotcall.htm (Jan. 22,
2002).
87 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4583
(Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310) (2002).
88 Id. at 4586.
89 See id. at 4580.
90 16 C.F.R. §310.3(a)(1).
91 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4599.
92 16 C.F.R. §310.3(a) (1) (iv).
93 Id. at §310.3(a)(1)(vi).
94 "An outbound telephone call is 'abandoned' under
this section if a person answers it and the telemarketer does
not connect the call to a sales representative within two (2)
Specific to charitable telemarketing, the
amended rules prohibit the use of a false or mis-
leading statement "to induce any person to pay
for goods or services or to induce a charitable
contribution. '"4 16 Charitable solicitors are also re-
quired to identify the charitable organization for
which they are calling,9-7 and they must state that
the purpose of the call is to solicit a monetary do-
nation.918 The reason for this announcement is to
"ensure that the consumer is given information
promptly that will enable the consumer to decide
whether to allow the infringement on his or her
time and privacy to go beyond the initial inva-
sion."'99 However, the FTC does not require a
telemarketing organization, soliciting on behalf of
a charity, to identify itself as a for-profit organiza-
tion, nor does the FTC require the telemarketer
to announce the percentage of the donation that
will be retained by the for-profit company.100 The
FTC has determined that a failure to state the per-
centage retained by the for-profit telemarketing
company does not satisfy the definition of fraudu-
lent behavior.101
This FTC determination is consistent with Su-
preme Court precedent that strikes down percent-
age-based regulations and prohibits fraud claims
against telemarketing companies solely because
they retain a large percentage of the charitable
donations. 10 2 Three cases in the 1980s struck
down state regulation of the percentage of fees
that charities could pay to raise funds: Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,10 3
Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson,10 4
and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina, Inc.'I' 5 These landmark cases established
the standards that govern charitable solicitation
seconds of the person's completed greeting." Id. at
§310.4(b) (1) (iv).
95 Id. at §310.4(a) (7).
96 Id. at §310.3(a) (4).
97 Id. at §310.4(e) (1).
98 Id. at §310.4(e) (2).
99 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4650; See
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487
U.S. 781, 799 n.ll (1988).
100 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4650.
101 See discussion of Telemarketing Associates, infra text ac-
companying notes 129-147.
102 Seth Perlman, Overview of Government Regulation of
Charitable Solicitations, 1330 PRACTICING LAW INST. 123, 129
(2002).
1O3 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
104 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
105 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
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today, and paved the way for the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Illinois v. Telemarketing Associ-
ates. 106
A. Percentage-Based Regulations
The statute challenged in Village of Schaumberg
required organizations that solicit in the commu-
nity to apply for a permit.10 7 To be eligible for a
permit, the organization had to first demonstrate
that "at least seventy-five per cent [sic] of the pro-
ceeds of such solicitations will be used directly for
the charitable purpose of the organization." 10 8
The respondent in this case, Citizens for a Better
Environment, was a non-profit organization that
had been denied a permit and thereafter filed a
constitutional challenge based on the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.10 9
The Court outlined precedent prior to Village of
Schaumberg, which collectively held that charitable
solicitations are within the protections of the First
Amendment but may be subject to limitation.110
Prior authorities, therefore, clearly establish that chari-
table appeals for funds, on the street or door to door,
involve a variety of speech interests-communication of
information, the dissemination and propagation of
views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes-that are
within the protection of the First Amendment. Solicit-
ing financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasona-
ble regulation but the latter must be undertaken with
due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteris-
tically intertwined with informative and perhaps persua-
sive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on economic, political, or social issues,
and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of
such information and advocacy would likely cease. Fur-
thermore, because charitable solicitation does more
than inform private economic decisions and is not pri-
marily concerned with providing information about the
characteristics and costs of goods and services, it has
not been dealt with in our cases as a variety of purely
commercial speech.' 1 '
The issue in Village of Schaumberg, therefore, turns
on whether the government regulation unduly in-
truded upon the solicitor's free speech rights.'12
The Court held that the 75% limitation was "a
direct and substantial limitation on protected
106 123 S.Ct. 1829 (2003).
107 444 U.S. at 622-23 (citing Art. III of Chapter 22 of the
Schaumberg Village Code (1975)).
1tO8 Id.
109 Id. at 624-25.
110 Id. at 628-32.
M Id. at 632.
112 Id. at 633.
113 Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637.
114 Id. at 638.
activity that cannot be sustained unless it serves a
sufficiently strong, subordinating interest that the
Village is entitled to protect." By concluding that
the government improperly justified the regula-
tion based on fraud prevention, the Court deter-
mined that the blanket prohibition was not the
least intrusive means to prohibit fraud. 1-3 Further,
the Court concluded that is it unlikely that "orga-
nizations devoting more than one-quarter of their
funds to salaries and administrative costs are any
more likely to employ solicitors who would be a
threat to public safety than are other charitable
organizations."1 14 In striking down the law, the
Supreme Court believed that the penal law should
be used to regulate fraudulent activity.115
In Munson, the Court examined its decision in
Village of Schaumberg by evaluating whether a stat-
ute will overcome the constitutional bar to per-
centage-based regulations by allowing an excep-
tion for charitable organizations that demonstrate
a need for the additional funding. 1 6 Despite the
statute's "flexibility," the Munson Court concluded
that the Maryland statute in question' 17 was un-
constitutional,' 18 stating, "[t]he flaw in the statute
is not simply that it includes within its sweep some
impermissible applications, but that in all its ap-
plications it operates on a fundamentally mis-
taken premise that high solicitation costs are an
accurate measure of fraud." 119 While the possibil-
ity of waiver will assist some organizations that are
improperly silenced by the blanket prohibition,
the Court held that the statute was not narrowly
drawn to prevent interference with the solicitor's
First Amendment rights.1 20
The North Carolina statute evaluated in Riley
contained a three-tiered definition of a "reasona-
ble fee" that a solicitor may retain while working
on behalf of a charity. If the fund-raising fee was
less than 20%, the retention was reasonable; if the
fee was between 20% and 35% of gross receipts,
the classification was reasonable or unreasonable
depending on whether the group was working for
115 Id. at 637.
116 467 U.S. at 962.
117 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §103A et. seq. (1982).
118 Munson, 467 U.S. at 970.
119 Id. at 966.
120 "[T] he means chosen to accomplish the State's objec-
tives are too imprecise, so that in all its applications the stat-
ute creates an unnecessary risk of chilling free speech." Id. at
968.
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the public good; and finally, if the fee was more
than 35%, it was automatically classified as unrea-
sonable.' 2 ' The Court dismissed these distinctions
in the North Carolina statute. Citing Village of
Schaumburg and Munson, the Court held that a
percentage-based regulation, however crafted, is
not narrowly tailored to overcome a constitutional
challenge. 2
2
The statute in Riley also required professional
fundraisers to disclose the percentage of the do-
nation that would actually be relayed to the char-
ity. 123 The state justified this disclosure require-
ment by stressing the "importance of informing
donors how the money they contribute is spent in
order to dispel the alleged misconception that the
money they give to professional fundraisers goes
in greater-than-actual proportion to benefit char-
ity." 12 4 The Court rejected the claim that this was
an appropriate justification for compelling
speech. 125 The Court relied on several principles
in making this determination: a professional fun-
draiser may assist the charity in other ways than
collecting monetary donations, such as getting a
name or message out; 1 2 6 donors are aware that
there are costs associated with professional fun-
draising and have the right to inquire into the
specific amount if they are concerned that their
donation will not reach the charity;' 2 7 and the re-
quired disclosure would cause more cautious giv-
ing thus harming the charitable organization's
121 Riley, 487 U.S. at 784 n.2.
122 Id. at 803.
123 Id. at 786. Note this case is distinct from Village of
Schaumberg and Munson in that the statute specifically ad-
dresses professional for-profit fundraisers and not the char-ity.
124 Id. at 789.
125 This was a content-based restriction which was not
sufficiently tailored to the state objective. See discussion of
content-based verses content-neutral restrictions, infra note
215.
126 Riley, 487 U.S. at 798-99.
127 Id. at 799.
128 Id. at 799-800; See Arcadi, supra note 18, at 426-28
(discussing the impact of telemarketing regulations on small
businesses).
129 Certiorari granted Nov 4. 2002 and oral arguments
heard March 4, 2003. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,
DocKET FOR 01-1806, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
docket/01-1806.htm.
130 Ryan v. Telemarketing Associates and Illinois v.
Telemarketing Associates are the same case. James E. Ryan was
Attorney General of Illinois in 2001 when the case was before
the Illinois Supreme Court. Lisa Madigan was the Attorney
General of Illinois when the Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari and handed down its opinion.
131 Telemarketing Associates, 123 S.Ct. at 1832
likelihood of continued success. '28
B. Claims of Fraud
The Supreme Court again discussed the issue of
percentage-based restrictions for telemarketers
working on behalf of a charitable organization in
its Fall 2003 term 29 in Illinois v. Telemarketing Asso-
ciates." 0 The case "concerns the amenability of
for-profit fundraising corporations to suit by the
Attorney General of Illinois for fraudulent chari-
table solicitations."1"1 This case was appealed after
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Attorney
General's fraud claim was "constitutionally defi-
cient" based on the United States Supreme
Court's rulings in Village of Schaumberg, Munson,
and Riley. 132
Telemarketing Associates is a for-profit
telemarketing company that solicits donations on
behalf of VietNow, a charitable organization that
works to provide assistance to Vietnam veter-
ans. 133 However, only 3% of the charitable contri-
butions raised by Telemarketing Associates actu-
ally reached the veterans, 13% was used by
VietNow, and 85% was retained by Telemarketing
Associates as a collector's fee.13 4 The American In-
stitute of Philanthropy estimates that VietNow
"spent $91 to raise $100." 135 In response to these
statistics, the Illinois Attorney General filed 3 6 a
civil fraud suit against the for-profit company
132 Telemarketing Associates, 763 N.E.2d 289, 363 (Ill.
2001).
133 Brief for Respondant at 1, Ryan v. TelemarketingAssoci-
ates, 2003 WL 183812 (No. 01-1806).
134 "[F]rom July 1987 until the end of 1995, defendants'
fundraising efforts on behalf of VietNow resulted in collec-
tion of $7,127, 851. Of that amount, $6,073,887 was retained
by defendants, netting ViewNow $1,053,964, an amount just
under 15% of the gross receipts." Telemarketing Associates, 763
N.E.2d at 291. Karen Branch-Brioso, U.S. Justices Hear Illinois
Case Against Charity Fund-Raiser Today, SLTODAY.COM, at
http://www.sltoday.com/stltoday.news/stories.nsf/
News?D9664 (March 3, 2003).
135 Jane Vaughn, On the Docket - Medill School of Journal-
ism, at http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/su-
preme-court/docket/2002/march.html (2002).
136 Another issue stemming from Telemarketing Associates
is what role a state attorney general should play in regulating
telemarketing. See, e.g., Robert M. Langer, Point: State Attor-
neys General Should Have Broad Powers to Enforce a Federal
Telemarketing Fraud Law, 5 ANTITRUST 36 (1991) (discussing
the state attorneys general role in bringing suit in federal
court for violations of telemarketing regulations). In addi-
tion to granting power to the FTC to regulate fraudulent
telemarketing, the TCPA authorizes a state attorney general
to file suit. 15 U.S.C. §6103.
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claiming that they were misleading customers by
misrepresenting the amount of the donation that
was retained by the telemarketing company.'13 7 Il-
linois hoped to overcome Supreme Court prece-
dent by relying on the legal definition of fraud 38
instead of a percentage-based regulation. 39 How-
ever, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to accept
the state's distinction that it's "complaint utilizes
the 'less intrusive' measures for attacking fraud
suggested by the [ Village of Schaumberg] Court," by
focusing on an individual fraud suit rather than a
broad percentage-based restriction. 140
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that "the
Attorney General's complaint is, in essence, an at-
tempt to regulate the defendants' ability to en-
gage in a protected activity based upon a percent-
age-rate limitation. This is the same regulatory
principle that was rejected in Schaumberg, Munson
and Riley."'14 1 In his brief to the Supreme Court,
the Attorney General stressed the importance of
anti-fraud laws and argued that his claim was not
based wholly on percentage of fees and therefore
should not be dismissed by precedent. 42
Telemarketing Associates relied on the Court's
previous rulings that fraud cannot be determined
by the costs of fundraising and further argued
that petitioner's claim, in effect, would create an
affirmative disclosure requirement that is prohib-
ited by the First Amendment.14 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court in Telemarketing
Associates first reiterated its position in Village of
Schaumberg, Munson, and Riley that "certain regula-
tions of charitable subscriptions, barring fees in
excess of a prescribed level, effectively imposed
prior restraints on fundraising, and were there-
fore incompatible with the First Amendment." 144
The Court proceeded to draw a distinction be-
tween percentage-based regulations and suits for
137 It is worth noting that Telemarketing Associates satis-
fied the terms of its contract with VietNow, and VietNow did
not express any dissatisfaction with the work of Telemarket-
ing Associates. Telemarketing Associates, 763 N.E.2d at 291.
138 Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act (815 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN 505/1 et seq. (West
1996)) and section 2 of Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (815 ILL. COMe. STAT. ANN 510/2 (West 1996)).
13' CHARLES LANE, Will Telemarketer's Claims Ring True?,
WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2003, at Al 7.
14o Telemarketing Associates, 763 N.E.2d at 296-97 (quoting
Village of Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 637).
141 Id. at 297.
142 "Schaumberg, Munson, and Riley held that the percent-
age of donations devoted to fundraising expenses cannot, by
itself, be used to declare charitable solicitations fraudulent.
fraud that use the amount of money actually dis-
tributed to the charity as one factor in determin-
ing whether the company misrepresented its posi-
tion. 145 The holding, therefore, focuses on the ac-
tual representations made by the telemarketer,
and not the percentage retained by the for-profit
telemarketer, which alone is not sufficient to es-
tablish fraud. 14 6 The Court concluded,
[s]o long as the emphasis is on what the fundraisers
misleadingly convey, and not on percentage limitations
on solicitor's fees per se, such actions need not imper-
missibly chill protected speech .... Consistent with
our precedent and the First Amendment, States may
maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or
misleading representations designed to deceive donors
about how their donations will be used. 14
7
Consequently, the Supreme Court has armed
states with a mechanism for protecting its citizens
against fraudulent misrepresentations made by
for-profit companies working on behalf of charita-
ble organizations.
While this opinion is an important step toward
the prevention of fraudulent behavior in charita-
ble telemarketing, the ruling is limited to actions
by the state. Nonetheless, consumers may now
take an affirmative step to curb fraudulent behav-
ior on their own initiative by registering for the
national "do-not-call" list.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
NATIONAL "DO-NOT-CALL" LIST
The most dramatic amendment to the TSR is
the creation of a national "do-not-call"
database. 48 This database allows households to
place their telephone number on a list signifying
that they do not wish to be called for telemarket-
ing purposes.1 49 Telemarketing companies are re-
quired to "scrub" their list of potential callers pe-
These decisions did not hold that the share of donations
used for fundraising expenses is categorically irrelevant to
whether a fundraiser commits fraud." Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 131, at 10-11. Forty-five additional states signed
onto an amicus brief in support of the Illinois Attorney Gen-
eral.
143 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 133.
144 Telemarketing Associates, 123 S.Ct. at 1833.
145 Id. at 1839 ("there are differences critical to First
Amendment concerns between fraud actions trained on rep-
resentations made in individual cases and statutes that cate-
gorically ban solicitations when fundraising costs run high.").
146 Id. at 1840.
147 Id. at 1840, 1842.
148 16 C.F.R. §310.4(b)(1)(iii) (B).
149 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission. FTrC An-
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riodically to remove any names that have been ad-
ded to the database since the company last up-
dated their list. 151 In addition, legal action can be
initiated against any company that continues to
place calls to restricted numbers.15 1
The national "do-not-call" proposal, which re-
quired separate Congressional approval to be-
come effective, received almost unanimous sup-
port in the House.'15 2 Subsequently, President
Bush signed the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act
("Do-Not-Call Act") into law on March 12,
2003.'I -1 Congress agreed to cover a portion of the
cost of the database, which will require an esti-
mated $16 million over its first year to imple-
ment,1 54 and authorized the FTC to collect the re-
mainder of the cost from the telemarketers in the
form of registration fees. -1 5 5 The FTC's final
amended rule became effective March 31,
2003.156
While many welcomed the national database, 57
opponents expressed concern over the limitations
placed upon charitable telemarketing companies,
the jurisdiction of the FTC, and the infringement
upon the First Amendment rights of the
telemarketers. 15 During the comment period of
the FTC proposed "do-not-call" regulation, several
charitable organizations submitted statements
criticizing the reach of the proposal into charita-
ble solicitation. 59 Despite the fact that charitable
nounces Final Amendments to Telemarketing Sales Rule, In-
cluding National "Do Not Call" Registry, at http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/donnotcall.htm (Dec. 18, 2002)
[hereinafter FTC Announces Final Amendments].
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 David Ho, House OKs National Do Not Call List, WASH-
INGTONPOST.COM, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A1697-2003Febl3.html (Feb. 13, 2003) (ex-
plaining the House vote was 418-7 in favor of the national
"do-not-call" list) [hereinafter House OKs List]. "The pro-
gram will not need separate Senate approval under an agree-
ment [reached in Congress] late Wednesday." Id.
153 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10,
117 Stat. 557 (2003), to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §6101; 'Do
Not Call' List Now Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2003, at E2.
154 House OKs List, supra note 153.
155 David Ho, House Approves Telemarketing 'Do Not Call'
List: Deal in Senate Would Give FTC Money to Set Up Registy This
Fiscal Year, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2003, at E7.
156 Kristin A. K. Hickerson, Overview of Amendments to
FTC's Telemarketing Sales Rule, 6 PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP. 1
(2003) (analyzing the FTC's amendment to the TSR).
157 FTC Announces Final Amendments, supra note 149
(quoting FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris) ("These amend-
ments [to the TSR] redefine the nature of telemarketing for
both consumers and businesses .... They protect consum-
ers' privacy, give them a choice about whether to receive
organizations are "exempt" from utilizing this
national database, 16 11 they are now required to
maintain entity-specific databases to avoid repeti-
tive calls to those who do not wish to contrib-
ute.'6 ' However, perhaps the main concern of
charitable organizations stems from the require-
ment that for-profit organizations working on be-
half of a charitable organization are forced to
comply with the "do-not-call" list.162 They found
this requirement to be problematic because it pe-
nalizes those charitable organizations that have
decided to hire a telemarketing company, and it
exempts charities that place the call them-
selves. 163
This apparent double standard that exempts
charities, banks, insurance companies, and tele-
communications carriers, yet binds the private
telemarketing companies working on their behalf,
has caused some critics to contend that the FCC
may be better suited to regulate a national "do-
not-call" list.164 This argument is founded on the
larger jurisdiction granted to the FCC by the
Communications Act of 1934165 and by the TCPA.
The FCC is "charged with regulating interstate
and international communications by radio, tele-
vision, wire, satellite, and cable. The FCC's juris-
diction covers the 50 states, the District of Colum-
bia, and U.S. possessions."' 66 Therefore, it would
seem that the FCC would have greater authority
most telemarketing call, and provide enhanced protections
against fraudulent telemarketers.").
158 See generally, Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg.
4580 (responding to all critical comments received during
the comment period).
159 Id. at 4583.
160 16 C.F.R. §310.6(1).
161 The recipient of a solicitation telephone call may re-
quest that the charity remove their number from their caller
list, and by placing their name on the "entity-specific list," the
charity is precluded from calling again. DIRECT MARKETING
BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE, FTC UNVEILS Do-NOT-CALL PLAN AND
TOUGH NEW TELEPHONE RULES, at http://www.directmag.
com/ar/marketing-ftc-unveilsdonotcall/index.htm (last
modified Dec. 18, 2002).
162 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4583.
163 See id.
164 Elizabeth C. Yen, New Federal Telemarketing Proposals -
Moving One Step Closer to a National "Do Not Call" Registry?, 120
BANKING L.J. 161, 163 (2003) (discussing the distinction that
banks would be exempt from the FTC proposed "do-not-call"
list, but would be bound by an FCC database).
165 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
U.S.C. §151.
166 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ABOUT THE
FCC, at http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last modified
Nov. 25, 2002).
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than the FTC to obligate industries to comply
with the database. 167 Consequently, the FCC an-
nounced its intention to revise its existing
telemarketing regulations in an attempt to imple-
ment a national "do-not-call" list.168
As originally enacted, the TCPA authorizes the
FCC to establish a national database compiled of
a "list of telephone numbers of residential sub-
scribers who object to receiving telephone solici-
tations, and to make that compiled list and parts
thereof available for purchase.' 169 The FCC chose
not to implement a national system in 1992, but
due to a growing number of consumer complaints
and technological advances that make telemarket-
ing more intrusive, the FCC determined a "do-
not-call" list was needed. 170 The FCC issued the
following order,
we establish with the [FTC] a national do-not-call regis-
try for consumers who wish to avoid unwanted
telemarketing calls .... [Consumers] 'want something
done' about unwanted solicitation calls, and the vast
majority of them support the establishment of a na-
tional do-not-call registry. Congress, too, has re-
sponded by enacting the [Do-Not-Call Act], authorizing
the establishment of a national do-not-call registry, and
directing this Commission to issue final rules in its sec-
ond major TCPA proceeding that maximize consistency
with those of the FTC. 1 7
1
The Do-Not-Call Act requires that the FTC and
FCC work in concert to "maximize consis-
tency."1 72 For the most part, the agencies have ac-
complished this goal. However, "Congress has
recognized that because the FCC is bound by the
TCPA, it would not be possible for the FCC to
adopt rules that are identical to those of the FTC
in every instance."'17 3 One major difference noted
thus far is the inconsistent treatment of for-profit
telemarketers working on behalf of charitable or-
ganizations.
As discussed in Part III, Congress has expanded
the regulatory powers of the FTC to restrict the
telemarketing practices of for-profit telemarketers
working on behalf of a charitable organization by
amending its definition of telemarketing.' 74 Con-
versely, the FCC has taken the position that pro-
167 Id.
168 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Rcd.
17459 (2002).
169 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3).
170 Report and Order, supra note 53, at paras. 1641.
171 Id. at paras. 1, 2.
172 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10,
§3, 117 Stat. 557 (2003) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §6101).
fessional telemarketers that work for a charitable
organization are not required to comply with the
national "do-not-call" list and other provisions of
the TCPA. 175 The FCC reasons that roughly 60%
of charitable organizations use the "experience"
and "expertise" of for-profit telemarketers to ad-
vance their cause, and thus, professional
telemarketers should be able to assist these chari-
ties promote their cause. 176
Congress has announced that the FCC and FTC
have two options for correcting the inconsisten-
cies in their enforcement of the national "do-not-
call" list: they may administratively resolve the dif-
ference or allow for legislative resolution. 77 The
FCC has announced it intends to work with the
FTC regarding this matter. 17 However, it seems
unlikely that the FTC will change its position.
Based on the recent amendment to the TSR, it
appears that Congress supports the FTC's posi-
tion to restrict all for-profit telemarketers. Re-
quiring professional telemarketers that work on
behalf of a charity to comply with the national
"do-not-call" list will, in effect, uphold the stated
goals of telemarketing legislation-"encouraging
the growth of the legitimate telemarketing indus-
try, while curtailing those practices that are abu-
sive or deceptive.' 179
Restricting the practices of telemarketing com-
panies that work on behalf of charitable organiza-
tions offers consumers a means to distinguish be-
tween solicitation calls made by the charity itself
and solicitation calls made by third parties on be-
half of a charitable organization. By signing up
for the database, a consumer would provide him-
self with a mechanism for determining whether
calls made to his home were made by the charity
or a professional telemarketer, who may retain a
percentage of the donation.'8 0 The "do-not-call"
list could increase the number of charitable con-
tributions made over the phone because consum-
ers would have more confidence in the calls they
receive. Thus, to limit properly the intrusion of
17-3 Report and Order, supra note 53, at para. 15.
174 See text associated with footnotes 82-101.
175 Report and Order, supra note 53, at para. 28.
176 Id.
177 H.R. REP. No. 108-8, at 4 (2003).
178 Report and Order, supra note 53, at para. 15.
179 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4583.
180 Kenneth Bredemeier, Groups Check to See if Charities
Measure Up, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2003, at F11.
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telephone solicitations and to increase consumer
confidence in charitable telemarketing, the FCC
should work in concert with the FTC to preclude
all professional telemarketing companies, regard-
less of their purpose, from calling those consum-
ers that do not wish to be called.
While the FTC and FCC continue to work to-
gether to implement one national system, they are
additionally fighting legal battles in the court-
room. The "do-not-call" list has undergone signif-
icant challenges on the grounds that the national
database violates the First Amendment and that
the FTC list violates the authority granted the
agency by the TCPA.' 8 ' The Tenth Circuit re-
cently announced that the FTC and the FCC may
enforce the "do-not-call" list pending its ruling on
the constitutionality of the national database.' 8 2
A. First Amendment Analysis
The major obstacle to regulating unsolicited
telemarketing is the telemarketer's First Amend-
ment right to communicate with consumers. 18 3
Professional telemarketers have challenged the
constitutionality of the "do-not-call" list on the
theory they are unjustly prohibited from freely
communicating with consumers. 18 4 Charitable or-
ganizations, despite exemption from the TSR, are
concerned with the constitutionality of the
database because the companies they hire to so-
licit donations on their behalf are restricted from
unsolicited telemarketing by the amended
TSR. 18 5 Because the TSR applies only to for-profit
organizations, the constitutionality of the national
"do-not-call" list must be analyzed by commercial
181 Two groups of telemarketers have filed suit challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the national "do-not-call" list.
They claim the provision violates established free-speech
laws. Linda Rosencrance, Telemarketers Sue to Stop National Do-
Not-Call List, COMPUTERWORLD.COM, at http://
www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/
story/0,10801,78023,00.html (Jan. 30, 2003). The first suit
was filed in an Oklahoma federal court by the NY DMA,
Global Contact Services, Infocision Management Corp., U.S.
Security Inc., and Chartered Benefit Services. The second
suit was brought by American Teleservices Association, Main-
stream Marketing Services, Inc., and TMG Marketing Inc. in
a Colorado federal court. Id.
182 Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. FTC, No. 03-9571
(10th Cir. 2003). See aLo Paul Davidson, FTC Told to Enforce
Do-not-call List, USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 2003, at BI; Lous Ro-
mano, Judges Hear Do-Not-Call Registry Case, "WASH. POST, Nov.
11, 2003, at El.
183 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or
speech standards.186
The Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.'1 7 held that commercial speech is not outside
the protection of the First Amendment. 88 The
Court stated that speech will be protected "even
though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or
otherwise pay or contribute money."8'9 At issue in
this case was whether a provision of the Virginia
Code, which prohibited pharmacists from adver-
tising the price of prescription drugs, was uncon-
stitutional. 19' Despite the State's interest in pro-
moting professionalism among its pharmacists,
the Court concluded that the statute could not be
upheld because "[a]dvertising, however tasteless
and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonethe-
less the dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what rea-
son, and at what price . . . the free flow of com-
mercial information is indispensable."'' - l There-
fore, telemarketers receive First Amendment pro-
tection despite the fact that their communications
are motivated by profit. 19 2 However, the govern-
ment does have the right to limit telemarketers'
speech in certain situations. 193
The validity of a government restriction on
commercial speech is governed by the test origi-
nally mandated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New
York.19 4 In this case, the Court developed a four-
part analysis when reviewing commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expres-
sion is protected by the First Amendment. For com-
mercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceable to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
184 See discussion of court cases, supra note 181.
185 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4583.
186 See Cain, supra note 46, at 642-49 (distinguishing free
speech protection for non-commercial solicitation from free
commercial speech).
187 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
188 Id. at 761.
189 Jd.
190 Id. at 749-50.
191 Id. at 765.
192 Id.
193 For example, "[f]alse or deceptive advertising is not
protected under the First Amendment and is permissibly po-
liced by the Federal Trade Commission and state authori-
ties." Cain, supra note 46, at 645 n.24 (citing 15 U.S.C. §45
(1986)).
194 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental inter-
est is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive an-
swers, we must determine whether the regulation di-
rectly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.1
95
Accordingly, the "do-not-call" list must be ana-
lyzed according to these four criteria to deter-
mine whether the database would be an appropri-
ate limitation on the telemarketer's protected
speech.
1. Rights of Free Speech and Privacy
The first prong of the Central Hudson test is sat-
isfied when it can be demonstrated that the First
Amendment protects the speech in question.19 6
To be protected by the First Amendment, the
speech must not be misleading or unlawful.' 9 7
The required telemarketing procedures outlined
in the TCPA and TSR are designed to prevent
fraudulent activity during sales calls. Therefore, if
the telemarketer follows the required disclosures,
the speech is not misleading.1 98 Additionally, be-
cause solicitation is considered commercial
speech, and as stated above in the discussion of
Virginia State Board, commercial speech is pro-
tected by the First Amendment, then it follows
that telemarketing sales calls are lawful.1 99
The protection of individual privacy rights in
the home is an established government inter-
est,2 00 and therefore, the second prong of the test
is also satisfied. 20 ' The Supreme Court has held
that "[i]ndividuals are not required to welcome
unwanted speech into their own homes and the
government may protect this freedom." 20 2 There-
fore, the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test
clearly pass constitutional scrutiny, and the consti-
tutionality of the national "do-not-call" list thus
195 Id. at 566.
196 Id. at 563.
1'7 Id. at 566.
198 See supra Part 1I for discussion of TCPA and TSR.
199 See Telemarketing Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 102d Cong. 4 (1992).
200 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L.
REx. 1087, 1137-40 (2002) (analyzing the right to privacy
within one's home).
201 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
202 Frisby v. Schulz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
203 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
204 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4628.
205 Id.
depends on the satisfaction of the final two
prongs of the commercial speech test.
2. Direct Proportionality Requirement
Prohibiting calls to consumers who have stated
that they do not wish to be called would directly
advance the state interest in protecting personal
privacy. 20 3 In fact, the national "do-not-call" list is
designed to cure the inadequacies with the com-
pany-specific databases previously used to protect
the privacy interests of citizens. 2°4 Experience has
shown that calls do not subside with entity-specific
lists because every telemarketing company is still
entitled to interrupt a consumer at least once.
The consumer is then responsible for taking the
time to specifically request that each individual
company not call again. 20 5 The enacted national
"do-not-call" list allows a consumer to take one ac-
tion to prevent all unwanted calls.2 0 6
Moreover, it has been argued that the
telemarketing companies may actually be ad-
vantaged by the database because they now have a
list of consumers who would refuse their calls.20 7
If a company knows that a consumer will reject a
sales pitch or hang up before hearing an explana-
tion of what is being sold, the company saves time
and money by avoiding calls to disinterested con-
sumers. Further "the existence of a no-call list
also serves to identify individuals who could be ap-
proached alternatively by direct mail initiatives,
perhaps a better and more palatable way to gain
their attention." 20 1 Thus, the companies may also
be able to maximize their resources by distin-
guishing between those customers who wish to re-
ceive telephone calls and those better served with
printed solicitations. 20 9
206 Id.
207 Klett & Brightwell, supra note 2, at 38.
208 Id.
209 Pattison & McGann, supra note 53, at 168 ("[T]he
shrill and imperious ring of the telephone demands immedi-
ate attention. Unlike the unsolicited bulk mail advertise-
ments found in the mail collected at one's leisure, the ring of
the telephone mandates prompt response, interrupting a
meal, a restful soak in the bathtub, even intruding upon the
intimacy of the bedroom . . . Unlike the radio or the televi-
sion, whose delivery of speech, either commercial or non-
commercial, depends on the listener's summons, the tele-
phone summons the subscriber, depriving him or her of the
ability to select the expression to which he or she will expose
herself or himself.").
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3. Reasonable Relationship Requirement
The final prong to the Central Hudson test re-
quires a reasonable relationship between the re-
striction and the protected right. 2"1 Subsequent
to its ruling in Central Hudson, the Supreme Court
in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York
v. Fox-'I clarified that the fourth requirement of
Central Hudson was satisfied when the "means
[were] narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective." 21 2 The holding in Fox "broadened the
scope of restrictions that the government can
place on commercial speech without violating the
speaker's First Amendment rights." 2 13 Therefore,
it must be demonstrated that the database is not
more extensive than necessary. 2 14 As discussed,
the entity-specific restrictions do not properly
curb telemarketing calls so a more restrictive reg-
ulation is needed. Further, the national database
is more beneficial to a telemarketing company
than an outright ban.21 5
The type of restriction placed upon
telemarketers by the establishment of a national
"do-not-call" list is similar to several restrictive ac-
tivities that the Supreme Court has previously
held constitutional against First Amendment chal-
lenges. These activities include the blocking of of-
fensive mail from certain addresses 2' 6 and the
posting of a "No Solicitation" sign on one's front
door.2 17 The common distinguishing feature of
these regulations is that the consumer is required
to take an affirmative step to inform the business
that they do not want to receive the company's in-
210 447 U.S. at 566.
211 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
212 Id. at 480.
213 Kertz & Burnette, supra note 4, at 1044.
214 492 U.S. at 480.
215 It is important to note at this time that the restric-
tions placed upon telemarketers in the TSR are content-neu-
tral. In addition to the Central Hudson four prong test, com-
mercial speech is governed by the "time, place, or manner"
test defined in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S 410,
428 (1993). "Essentially, the time, place, or manner test's
only significant difference from the commercial speech test is
the application of an initial additional prong: the restriction
cannot be based on the content of the regulated speech."
Joseph R. Cox, Telemarketing, The First Amendment, And Privacy:
Expanding Telemarketing Regulations Without Violating the Consti-
tution, 17 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 403, 407-408 (1996). See
also, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
Therefore, it is not necessary to address this additional test in
detail because the restrictions are not content-based.
The FTC defends its position of content neutrality by ex-
plaining that "[t] he company-specific 'do-not-call' provisions
apply equally to all for-profit solicitors, regardless of whether
formation.2 18s
In Rowen v. Post Office Department,2 19 the Court
upheld a regulation allowing homeowners to re-
move themselves from company mailing lists.2()
Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary
Act of 1967 permitted homeowners to request
that a company not send them offensive solicita-
tions. 22 1 The Court upheld the constitutionality of
the statute against a First Amendment challenge
and concluded that the regulation sufficiently
protects an individual's right to determine what
speech flows in and out of his home. The Court
held,
[w]e therefore categorically reject the argument that a
vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise
to send unwanted material into the home of another.
If this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even
valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press
even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient. That we
are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home
and subject to objectionable speech and other sound
does not mean we must be captives everywhere.
222
In the same manner, and for the same reasons,
that a homeowner may notify the Postmaster Gen-
eral that he does not want to receive mailings, a
homeowner should be able to notify
telemarketers through a national "do-not-call"
database that he does not wish to receive solicita-
tion telephone calls in his home.
The Supreme Court has also determined that
cities may prevent door-to-door sales persons
from approaching a home that has a "No Solicita-
tion" sign posted. 22 3 In Martin v. City of
Struthers,2 2 4 the Court held that a complete ban
they are seeking sales of goods or services or charitable con-
tributions, and regardless of what may be expressed in the
solicitation calls themselves or the viewpoints of the organiza-
tions on whose behalf the solicitation was made."
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4636. Further,
"the 'do-not-call' registry provisions are also content-neutral,
because they apply equally to all sellers and telemarketers en-
gaged in the solicitation of sales of goods or services, regard-
less of the content of the calls, or the viewpoints of the
telemarketers or the sellers." Id. at n.678.
216 See Rowen v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
217 See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
218 Rowen, 397 U.S. at 737 ("[T]he mailer's right to com-
municate is circumscribed only by an affirmative act of the
addressee giving notice that he wishes no further mailings
from that mailer.").
219 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
221 Id. at 740.
221 Id. at 729.
222 Id. at 738.
223 Shannon, supra note 1, at 383-84.
224 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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on door-to-door solicitation is an inappropriate
restriction on the freedom to disseminate infor-
mation 22 5 because it "makes a person a criminal
trespasser if he enters the property of another for
an innocent purpose without an explicit com-
mand from the owners to stay away."2 2 6 However,
the Court also discussed a proposed regulation
that would make it unlawful for a sales person to
approach a home when the homeowner has indi-
cated he is unwilling to be disturbed.227 The
Court's discussion implies that a similar restric-
tion allowing telephone callers to place a "No
Call" sign on their phone is a reasonable restric-
tion on a telemarketer's right to communicate
with consumers. 228
In Village of Schaumburg, the Court refers to
posting of "No Solicitation" signs as an appropri-
ately balanced limitation on a solicitor's business.
The Court states, "[o]ther provisions of the ordi-
nance, which are not challenged here, such as the
provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors
from the property by posting signs reading 'No
Solicitors or Peddlers Invited' suggest the availa-
bility of less intrusive and more effect measures to
protect privacy."229 Therefore, it is reasonable
that a statute which requires a consumer to af-
firmatively refuse a solicitation is also an appropri-
ately balanced regulation. 23°1
The aforementioned cases demonstrate that a
person has the right to decide what speech comes
in and out of their home. In fact, "the Supreme
Court has suggested that individual blocking of
speech is an acceptable way to balance the rights
of the speaker, the willing recipients, and the un-
willing recipients without unconstitutionally re-
stricting the speech."231 The national "do-not-call"
list similarly balances the individuals right to pri-
vacy with the telemarketer's right to communicate
his idea by requiring a household to affirmatively
block calls. 232 This solution ultimately allows the
225 Id. at 149.
226 Id. at 148.
227 Id. ("A city can punish those who call at a home in
defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant
and, in addition, can by identification devices control the
abuse of the privilege by criminals posing as canvassers.")
228 Shannon, supra note 1, at 383 n.22 ("Similar to these
no-solicitation ordinances, do-no-call legislation enables a
governmental body to punish solicitors who telephone home-
owners in defiance of their previously expressed will. Under
the Court's logic in Martin, do-not-call proposals aimed at
curbing telephone solicitation appear reasonable.").
229 Village of Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 639 (citations omit-
consumer to decide whether to receive the infor-
mation into their household, and allows the gov-
ernment to regulate without intruding upon the
telemarketer's First Amendment rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems associated with telemarketing
have been expressed by consumers, legislators
and government agencies, and it is time to take
action to protect the privacy rights of an individ-
ual in his home. Homeowners have the freedom
to place a "No Solicitation" sign on their door to
prevent sales persons from visiting their home.
Citizens have a right to place a "No Trespassing"
sign on their property with the expectation that
no one will enter upon their land. Technological
advances, however, have made it possible for
telemarketers to stand at the edge of one's prop-
erty, whether protected by a "No Solicitation" sign
or not, and place a call into the home. Therefore,
to maintain the established standard of privacy, it
is imperative that a homeowner is provided with
the means to place a "Do Not Call" sign on his
telephone to combat technological advances in
solicitation techniques. The national "do-not-call"
database provides this avenue for further protec-
tion.
The amended TSR is an appropriately balanced
regulation that considers both the First Amend-
ment rights of professional telemarketers and the
privacy rights of homeowners. Furthermore, the
TSR's exclusion of for-profit telemarketing com-
panies working on behalf of charitable organiza-
tions upholds the goal of the "do-not-call" list bet-
ter than the FCC's waiver. The stated goal of the
database is to prevent unwanted commercial
speech from entering the home. Therefore, char-
itable organizations may continue to solicit dona-
tions for their cause over the telephone because
ted).
230 Jennifer L. Radner, Comment, Phone, Fax and Frustra-
tion: Electronic Commercial Speech and Nuisance Law, 42 EMORY
LJ. 359, 384 (1993) ("The Court appears to be extremely vig-
ilant in shielding the sanctity of the home from unwanted
communications . . . as long as the statutorily approved
method of preventing the communication involves some af-
firmative action by the home owner.").
231 Kertz & Burnette, supra note 4, at 1050.
232 See Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Tele-
phone Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4 YALEJ. ON REG. 99 (1986)
(suggesting that blocking services are the most appropriate
manner in which to regulate).
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their intention is not commercial but professional
telemarketers must be bound by the "do-not-call"
list. The national "do-not-call" list will assist con-
sumers in distinguishing between charitable orga-
nizations and the for-profit companies working
on behalf of a charity, thereby allowing consum-
ers to make a more informed decision before con-
tributing money over the telephone.
2004]

